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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Gary E. Hindes, and other shareholders of Meritor 
Savings Bank ("Meritor"), appeal from various district court 
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orders dismissing their claims against the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Pennsylvania 
Secretary of Banking ("Secretary"). Appellants contend that 
the appellees wrongfully seized Meritor, thereby depriving 
them of their substantive due process rights. More 
particularly, appellants allege that the FDIC reneged on an 
agreement with Meritor with respect to the computation of 
its capital base, ignored Meritor's actual financial condition 
when seizing Meritor, and engaged in a conspiracy with 
state officials to close the bank. Appellants also assert that 
the FDIC violated certain of its statutory duties as receiver. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1367 and 12 U.S.C. SS 1819(b)(2)(A) and 
1821(d)(6)(A). We have jurisdiction to review thefinal orders 
of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We 
exercise plenary review over the issues on this appeal, as 
they all require review of the district court's interpretation 
and application of legal precepts. See Turner v. Schering- 
Plough, Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The Secretary1 closed Meritor, the largest savings bank in 
Pennsylvania, on December 11, 1992, and appointed the 
FDIC as its receiver. The majority of appellants' allegations 
concern the events leading up to that closing, as they 
primarily object to the propriety of the seizure of Meritor. 
Because the district court disposed of all of appellants' 
claims on either motions to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, we accept as true their allegations, and therefore 
base our recitation of the facts on the allegations in the 
complaint. 
 
In 1982, at the FDIC's request, Meritor assumed the 
deposit liabilities of Western Savings Fund Society of 
Philadelphia ("Western"). To induce Meritor to assume these 
liabilities, the FDIC granted Meritor the right to amortize, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Secretary of Banking at the time of the events we describe was 
Sarah W. Hargrove. Since that time, Richard C. Rishel has replaced her. 
Thus, in this memo we refer to the Secretary as "he." See Fed. R. App. 
P. 43(c). 
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over a 15-year period, $796 million of "goodwill" resulting 
from the Western transaction ("grand-fathered goodwill"), 
thereby increasing Meritor's regulatory capital base. This 
transaction saved the FDIC and its Bank Insurance Fund 
$400 million. The FDIC and Meritor evidenced this 
regulatory goodwill inducement in a written agreement 
dated April 3, 1982. For over ten years, the FDIC and 
Meritor abided by that agreement. 
 
In an agreement dated April 5, 1991, the FDIC reaffirmed 
the 1982 agreement and further agreed to renegotiate 
Meritor's capital requirements if at any time Congress 
prohibited Meritor from considering this goodwill as a 
capital component. This 1991 agreement was prompted 
when Meritor proposed that its 12% Subordinated Capital 
Noteholders ("Noteholders") exchange their notes for stock 
and cash in order to infuse Meritor with more that $100 
million of additional capital. Because the Noteholders would 
become shareholders, the continuation of the goodwill as a 
regulatory asset of Meritor was crucial to them. Therefore, 
before agreeing to the proposal, representatives of the 
Noteholders met with senior management of the FDIC, who 
assured them that the FDIC had no plans to disallow the 
grand-fathered goodwill. In fact, the FDIC encouraged the 
Noteholders to participate in the exchange. The exchange 
was completed in 1991, resulting in a $108 million increase 
in Meritor's capital. 
 
On December 19, 1991, Congress adopted the FDIC 
Improvements Act of 1991, requiring the FDIC to adopt new 
rules regulating bank capital. The FDIC published draft 
regulations in the summer of 1991 which clearly permitted 
Meritor's grand-fathered goodwill to continue to be included 
in its capital. When the FDIC adopted final regulations in 
September 1991, however, the regulations differed from the 
proposals so as to create doubt as to whether Meritor's 
grand-fathered goodwill would remain as capital. The FDIC 
refused Meritor's request to clarify the uncertainty. The 
confusion created by the regulations resulted in a 
withdrawal of over $300 million in deposits from Meritor. 
 
The appellants allege that, by mid-September, the FDIC 
and the Secretary had begun to devise a plan to seize 
Meritor in mid-December 1992, which was approximately 
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the time the new regulations would take effect, and to sell 
its assets to one of Meritor's most aggressive competitors. 
 
On December 11, 1992, the FDIC hand-delivered a letter 
to Meritor reneging on its 1982 agreement and formally 
notifying Meritor that, under the new regulations, the 
grand-fathered goodwill no longer would be included in its 
capital base. On the same day, the FDIC also hand- 
delivered Meritor a "Notification to Primary Regulator" 
("Notification") which stated that the FDIC Board of 
Directors had found that Meritor was in violation of its 
1991 agreement regarding capital maintenance, was in an 
unsound condition, and had inadequate capital. In the 
Notification, the FDIC asserted that it immediately would 
institute proceedings to cancel Meritor's insurance if 
Meritor did not promptly satisfy certain capitalization 
requirements. Because insurance was a prerequisite to 
Meritor's continued operation, the demand created a crisis. 
The Secretary, who the FDIC notified of these matters prior 
to notifying Meritor, used the crisis to justify the immediate 
closing of the bank on the same afternoon. At that time, he 
appointed the FDIC as receiver of Meritor. Neither Meritor 
nor the appellants challenged the appointment under the 
state procedure available for that purpose. See Pa. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 71, S 733-605 (West 1990). 
 
The appellants also allege that the FDIC and the 
Secretary disregarded circumstances which rendered the 
closing of Meritor inappropriate. In particular, eight days 
before the closing of the bank, Meritor sold a subsidiary 
bringing in capital which put it in compliance with the 
capital maintenance agreement. In addition, on December 
9, 1992, two days prior to the closing of the bank, the FDIC 
received a bid of $181.3 million for Meritor's remaining 
operations and deposits. 
 
In August 1994, appellants filed this action against the 
FDIC, both in its corporate capacity ("FDIC-Corporate") and 
as receiver of Meritor ("FDIC-Receiver"), various unidentified 
agents and employees of the FDIC ("the Doe defendants"), 
and the Secretary. In general, the complaint alleges that 
these appellees deprived the appellants of their substantive 
due process rights2 and asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The complaint also alleges a deprivation of the privileges and 
immunities guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, 
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S 1983, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 
U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (1971), and the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA"). The complaint also alleges that the 
FDIC violated various statutory duties. 
 
By order entered March 1, 1995, the district court 
dismissed the due process claims, embodied in Count I, 
against the FDIC and the Secretary as well as appellants' 
APA claim in Count IV against FDIC-Corporate on the 
grounds that 12 U.S.C. S 1821(j) deprived it of jurisdiction 
to adjudicate those claims. The district court also dismissed 
the section 1983 claim against the FDIC, finding that the 
FDIC was not a "person" under that statute. 
 
By order entered September 6, 1995, the district court 
dismissed the claims against the FDIC for the enforcement 
of its statutory duties. On November 8, 1996, the district 
court approved a Stipulation of Dismissal of the remaining 
claims against the Secretary in his individual capacity, 
which the court entered on November 27, 1996. Thus, 
following the district court's order of November 27, 1996, 
appellants' only remaining claims were against the Doe 
defendants. 
 
On November 15, 1996, appellants moved the district 
court to certify its March 1, 1995 order for an interlocutory 
appeal. They argued that the claims involving the Doe 
defendants were substantially the same as those against 
the FDIC and an immediate appeal would avoid the waste 
that would occur if this court eventually overturned the 
district court's order. FDIC-Receiver and FDIC-Corporate 
objected to the certification of the March 1, 1995 order, in 
part because the appellants' request did not include a 
request to certify the September 6, 1995 order as well, 
which they argued would result in "piecemeal" appellate 
review. Thereafter, appellants agreed to an expansion of the 
proposed certification to include the district court's order of 
September 6, 1995. 
 
On April 27, 1997, the district court denied the 
appellants' motion to certify its orders. The district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
but we need not address this allegation in detail given our disposition of 
the claims. 
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dismissed the claims against the Doe defendants because 
there were no named parties remaining in the action and 
because appellants failed to identify the fictitious parties by 
the close of discovery. Having dismissed the claims against 
the Doe defendants, the court concluded that its orders 
were final so that it therefore denied the appellants' motion 





A. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL 
 
An untimely appeal does not vest an appellate court with 
jurisdiction. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 
434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 561 (1978); Marcangelo v. 
Boardwalk Regency, 47 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1995). To be 
timely, the notice of appeal must have been filed within 60 
days from the date of the district court's entry of a final 
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. S 1291; Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 
(establishing a 60-day period for appeal where a federal 
agency or officer is a party). In general, a judgment is not 
final for purposes of appeal until the district court has 
disposed of all claims against all parties. See Buzzard v. 
Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 
1992); Jackson v. Hart, 435 F.2d 1293, 1294 (3d Cir. 1970) 
(per curiam). 
 
Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as 
untimely. They argue that the district court's orders were 
final, thereby starting the running of the time to appeal, on 
November 27, 1996, upon the district court's dismissal of 
all claims except those against the Doe defendants. Thus, 
appellees aver that this appeal is untimely because the 
appellants did not file a notice of appeal until May 6, 1997, 
179 days after the district court's entry of a final judgment. 
We reject appellees' argument and hold that appellants 
timely filed this appeal so that we have jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal on its merits. 
 
Doe defendants "are routinely used as stand-ins for real 
parties until discovery permits the intended defendants to 
be installed." Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 34, 
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36 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (citations omitted). The case law is clear 
that "[f]ictitious parties must eventually be dismissed, if 
discovery yields no identities," id. at 37, and that an action 
cannot be maintained solely against Doe defendants. See 
Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1534-35 
(E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that Federal Rules do not 
contemplate a plaintiff proceeding without a tangible 
defendant except in extraordinary circumstances), aff'd on 
other grounds, 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991); Breslin v. City 
and County of Philadelphia, 92 F.R.D. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(dismissing complaint against identified defendants 
warrants dismissing unnamed defendants). 
 
Appellees conclude from these cases that Doe defendants 
are deemed dismissed, without a formal order by the 
district court, if they remain unnamed at the close of 
discovery or upon the district court's dismissal of all named 
defendants. We, however, need not reach the issue of 
whether the district court's order became final on November 
27, 1996, by virtue of such a deemed dismissal of the Doe 
defendants.3 Even if a final order was entered on that date, 
this appeal was timely because the "Motion to Certify for 
Immediate Appeal" which appellants filed on November 15, 
1996, was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal 
and therefore satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 
3. 
 
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires that a notice of appeal 
specify the parties taking the appeal and the orders from 
which the parties appeal. Despite these requirements, an 
"appeal will not be dismissed for informality of form or title 
of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose 
intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice." Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We have case law indicating that "[a]n order that effectively ends the 
litigation on the merits is an appealable final judgment even if the 
district court does not formally include judgment on a claim that has 
been abandoned" by a party. Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 970 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Jones v. Celotex Corp., 867 F.2d 1503, 1503- 
04 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. 
Major 
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 1986). We 
again recognize this authority, but need not decide whether it would 
apply in this case because, as explained above, this appeal would be 
timely without reliance on it. 
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Courts liberally construe the requirements for a notice of 
appeal. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 
678, 681-82 (1992); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 
U.S. 312, 316-17, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 2408-09 (1988). Thus, 
courts can find that a litigant has satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 3(c) even if the litigant files a 
document that is "technically at variance with the letter of 
[Rule 3] . . . if the litigant's action is the functional 
equivalent of what the rule requires." Torres, 487 U.S. at 
316-17, 108 S.Ct. at 2408-09. Therefore, if a litigant files a 
document, regardless of its title, within the time for appeal 
under Fed. R. App. P. 4, it is effective as a notice of appeal 
provided that it gives sufficient notice of the party's intent 
to appeal. See Smith, 502 U.S. at 248-49, 112 S.Ct. at 682. 
 
We have held that a "Petition for Permission to Appeal" 
filed under the mistaken belief that the district court's 
order was interlocutory, but which notified the parties and 
the court of the intention to appeal, functioned as a notice 
of appeal. See Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1237 
(3d Cir. 1992); see also San Diego Comm. Against 
Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont 
Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1473-74 (9th Cir. 
1986) (construing a Fed. R. App. P. 5(a) motion as a notice 
of appeal). 
 
In this case, appellants filed documents which were the 
"functional equivalent" of a notice of appeal. On November 
15, 1996, appellants filed a "Motion to Certify for Immediate 
Appeal" in which they sought leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal of the district court's March 1, 1995 order. Thus, 
even if the March 1 order became final on November 27, 
1996, we will treat the motion, which specifically indicated 
an intention to appeal, and which was filed in the belief 
that the order remained interlocutory, as a notice of appeal. 
See Landano, 970 F.2d at 1237. Subsequently, appellants 
also filed a reply to appellees' objection to the certification, 
which requested to expand the proposed certified appeal to 
include the district court's September 6, 1995 order. Taken 
together, these documents notify the parties and the court 
as to appellants' specific intention to seek appellate review 
of both orders. Therefore, the documents were the 
functional equivalent of a de jure notice of appeal. 
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Furthermore, appellants filed these documents within the 
period for a timely appeal under Rule 4. The "Motion to 
Certify for Immediate Appeal" was filed after the district 
court approved the stipulation of dismissal but before the 
order actually was entered. Rule 4(a)(2) specifically 
addresses this scenario as it provides that "[a] notice of 
appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order 
but before the entry of the judgment or order is treated as 
filed on the date of and after the entry" of that order. 
Pursuant to this rule, we treat the motion as filed on 
November 27, 1996, after the entry of the dismissal order. 
Accordingly, this appeal is timely.4 
 
B. DUE PROCESS AND APA CLAIMS 
 
On March 1, 1995, the district court held that 12 U.S.C. 
S 1821(j) deprived it of jurisdiction over appellants' due 
process and APA claims, Counts I and IV respectively, and 
therefore dismissed those counts against all appellees. By 
the same order, the district court also dismissed Count III, 
a 42 U.S.C. S 1983 claim, as against the FDIC for failure to 
state a claim because the FDIC is not a "person" within 
that statute.5 
 
We begin our merits analysis with a discussion of the 
appellants' First Amended Complaint. The district court 
analyzed the complaint as though Count I asserted an 
independent cause of action for a due process violation 
against all appellees. We do not adopt this construction of 
the complaint. 
 
Count I seeks the following remedies based upon an 
alleged due process violation: (1) a declaration that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In any event, Judge Roth and Judge Seitz conclude that this case is 
appealable because a timely notice of appeal was filed from the order 
dismissing the Doe defendants. 
 
5. Count III also asserts a section 1983 claim against the Secretary in 
his individual capacity. On November 27, 1996, the district court entered 
a Stipulation of Dismissal of the claims against the Secretary in his 
individual capacity. This appeal, therefore, does not concern Count III to 
the extent it asserts a claim against the Secretary in his individual 
capacity. 
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FDIC, Doe defendants and the Secretary violated 
appellants' substantive due process rights; (2) a declaration 
that the FDIC's notification is void and a rescission thereof; 
(3) a declaration of the invalidity of the Secretary's orders 
closing Meritor and appointing FDIC as receiver and 
rescissions thereof; and (4) the imposition of a constructive 
trust for Meritor's benefit nunc pro tunc. This count, 
however, does not identify the source of the substantive 
cause of action for the alleged constitutional violation as 
against each appellee. 
 
Accordingly, FDIC-Corporate urges us to dismiss Count I 
as improperly seeking declaratory relief without asserting a 
substantive cause of action. We decline to view the 
complaint so narrowly. Rather, we are required to construe 
the pleadings "as to do substantial justice," Fed R. Civ. P. 
8(f), and in favor of the appellants. See Budinsky v. 
Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 819 F.2d 
418, 421 (3d Cir. 1987); see also West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 
158, 163 (3d Cir. 1978) (liberally construing a complaint, 
which literally only sued defendants in their official 
capacities, so as also to state a claim against the 
defendants in their individual capacities because the 
complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute such a claim). 
 
The due process violations alleged in Count I against the 
FDIC and the Doe defendants properly are viewed as 
constitutional claims asserted under section 1983 and 
Bivens, as alleged in Counts III and II respectively. 
Therefore, Count I does not assert a separate cause of 
action against these defendants, but seeks declaratory and 
injunctive relief in addition to the relief requested in Counts 
II and III. 
 
The due process claim alleged against the Secretary in 
his official capacity is a different matter, however, because 
the complaint does not elsewhere identify a substantive 
cause of action against the Secretary in his official capacity 
for a due process violation. While Count III asserts a claim 
against the Secretary, it does so only in his individual 
capacity. Accordingly, although the complaint does not 
explicitly identify this claim as such, we construe it as 
asserting a section 1983 claim against the Secretary in his 
official capacity. 
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Thus, we proceed with our analysis as though the relief 
sought in Count I against the FDIC and the Doe defendants 
was sought in the counts alleging a right to relief pursuant 
to section 1983 and Bivens. Although our analysis of these 
counts takes a different course than that of the district 
court, we ultimately affirm its dismissal of these claims. 
We, like the district court, will not discuss the merits of the 
Bivens claim because the Doe defendants properly were 
dismissed on other grounds. 
 
1. Section 1983 Claim 
 
We begin our analysis with a discussion of the section 
1983 claim asserted against the FDIC. The district court 
dismissed this claim, holding that the FDIC was not a 
"person" within the meaning of section 1983 and therefore 
was not subject to section 1983 liability. The complaint 
alleges that the FDIC, under color of state law, acted in 
concert with the Secretary and deprived appellants of their 
substantive due process rights. The district court held that 
the FDIC could not be held liable under section 1983 
because it was not a "person" within the meaning of the 
statute. We agree. 
 
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against "[e]very 
person who, under color of any [state law] . .. subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Because section 
1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal law by 
persons acting pursuant to state law, federal agencies and 
officers are facially exempt from section 1983 liability 
inasmuch as in the normal course of events they act 
pursuant to federal law. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 
409 U.S. 418, 425, 93 S.Ct. 602, 606 (1973); see also Daly- 
Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (no 
section 1983 claim against federal officials acting pursuant 
to federal law); Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435 
(5th Cir. 1983) (action taken pursuant to federal law by 
federal agents and private parties); Kite v. Kelly, 546 F.2d 
334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976) (section 1983 is not applicable to 
federal officers acting under federal law); Scott v. United 
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States Veteran's Admin., 749 F. Supp. 133, 134 (W.D. La. 
1990) (federal government and its agencies acting under 
federal law are not "persons" within section 1983), aff'd, 
929 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 
It is a well-established principle, however, that federal 
officials are subject to section 1983 liability when sued in 
their official capacity where they have acted under color of 
state law, for example in conspiracy with state officials. See, 
e.g., Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd 
on other grounds, 502 U.S. 21, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991); Jorden 
v. National Guard Bureau, 799 F.2d 99, 111 n.17 (3d Cir. 
1986) (citing Knights of the Klu Klux Klan v. East Baton 
Rouge Parish, 735 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also 
Strickland v. Shalala, 123 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1992); Olson 
v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811, 821 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 
The allegations in the section 1983 claim, however, are 
against a federal agency, the FDIC, not federal officials. We 
find no authority to support the conclusion that a federal 
agency is a "person" subject to section 1983 liability, 
whether or not in an alleged conspiracy with state actors. 
We, therefore, hold that federal agencies are not "persons" 
subject to section 1983 liability.6 
 
In Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3d Cir. 
1970), we held that "[t]he United States and other 
governmental entities are not `persons' within the meaning 
of Section 1983." We reject appellants' suggestion that 
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have 
undermined Accardi's authority, except to the extent that 
the Court now recognizes municipal liability under section 
1983.7 See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We note that two district courts in this circuit recently have come to 
the same conclusion. See Alexander v. Hargrove, 1997 WL 14436, No. 
Civ. 93-5510 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1995); Hurt v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 
806 F. Supp. 515, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
 
7. In particular, appellants contend that in Accardi we relied on the 
Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of "person" in Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473 (1961), which the Court overruled in Monell 
v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1977), to the 
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658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1977). Accardi's holding that the 
United States was an improper party in a section 1983 
action, see Accardi, 935 F.2d at 1242, is not affected by the 
Supreme Court's subsequent recognition of municipal 
liability. Because the United States is not a proper 
defendant in a section 1983 action, neither is a federal 
agency, an arm of the sovereign. See United States v. Vital 
Health Prods., Ltd., 786 F. Supp. 761, 778 (E.D. Wis. 1992), 
aff 'd without opinion sub nom., United States v. LeBeau, 
985 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1993); John's Insulation, Inc. v. 
Siska Const. Co., 774 F. Supp. 156, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 
We also note that, relying upon Accardi, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that "a federal agency 
is . . . excluded from the scope of section 1983 liability." 
See Hoffman v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
519 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1975); see also LaRouche v. 
City of New York, 369 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(holding that the CIA, a federal agency, is not a person 
under section 1983). 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district 
court's dismissal of the section 1983 claim against the 
FDIC. In light of our discussion regarding the proper 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
extent that Monroe held that local governments were not subject to 
section 1983 liability. 
 
Although in Accardi we did not cite Monroe, we did rely on three cases 
which rejected liability for local government agencies based upon Monroe. 
See Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514, 81 S.Ct. 684 (1961); United 
States v. County of Phila., 413 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1969); Broome v. Simon, 
255 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. La. 1966). Appellants argue that because Monell 
reversed Monroe by holding that local governments are subject to suit 
under section 1983, the efficacy of Accardi has been undermined. 
 
Appellants essentially argue that under Monell and the Supreme 
Court's subsequent decision in Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 
U.S. 58, 69, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989), federal entities are subject to 
suit under section 1983. In Monell, the Court interpreted "person" for 
purposes of section 1983 to include "bodies politic and corporate." See 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-89, 98 S.Ct. at 2034-35. Appellants argue that 
the FDIC is within the meaning of "bodies politic and corporate" because 
12 U.S.C. S 1819 expressly characterizes the FDIC as a "body corporate." 
We reject this rationale. 
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construction of the complaint, our dismissal of the section 
1983 claim makes it unnecessary to discuss whether 12 
U.S.C. S 1821(j) would preclude the district court from 
granting the declaratory and injunctive relief requested in 
Count I to the extent it would operate against the FDIC. 
 
2. Bivens Claim 
 
Because we affirm the district court's dismissal of all of 
appellants' claims against the named appellees, we, like the 
district court, need not address the merits of appellants' 
Bivens claim against the Doe defendants. Rather, we affirm 
the dismissal of this claim because an action cannot 
proceed solely against unnamed parties. See Scheetz, 747 
F. Supp. at 1534. 
 
3. APA Claim 
 
a. 12 U.S.C. S 1821(j) 
 
We turn next to Count IV of appellants' complaint, which 
seeks APA review of the FDIC's issuance of the Notification 
finding that Meritor was operating in an unsafe and 
unsound condition. Count IV alleges that the FDIC's 
determinations, as embodied in the Notification, were 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and in violation 
of appellants' constitutional rights. Appellants thus seek 
the following remedies: (1) a declaration that thefindings 
are null and void; (2) a rescission of the declarations; and 
(3) the imposition of a constructive trust. The district court 
dismissed this claim as precluded by 12 U.S.C. S 1821(j). 
We agree. 
 
The Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") establishes a 
comprehensive scheme for conservatorships and 
receiverships of insured financial institutions. See Richard 
B. Gallagher, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Anti-Injunction Provision of Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) (12 U.S.C.A. 
S 1821(j)), 126 A.L.R. Fed. 43, 53 (1995). The FDIC8 may be 
appointed as a conservator or receiver of an insured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. FIRREA grants the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") the same 
powers and protections as the FDIC when the RTC operates as a 
receiver. See 12 U.S.C. S 1441a(b)(5),S 1441a(b)(4); see also Sunshine 
Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 112 n.6 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 
                                16 
  
financial institution if, inter alia, the institution becomes 
insolvent. See 12 U.S.C. S 1821(c); Gallagher, supra, at 53. 
FIRREA also includes an anti-injunction provision intended 
to permit the FDIC to perform its duties as conservator or 
receiver promptly and effectively without judicial 
interference. See 12 U.S.C. S 1821(j); Gallagher, supra, at 
54. Section 1821(j) provides in relevant part that 
 
       [e]xcept as provided in this section, no court may take 
       any action, except at the request of the Board of 
       Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect 
       the exercise of powers or functions of the Corporation 
       as a conservator or a receiver. 
 
12 U.S.C. S 1821(j). 
 
In making the determinations and issuing the 
Notification, the FDIC clearly was acting in its corporate 
capacity. Appellants argue that the district court erred in 
dismissing the APA claim based upon section 1821(j) 
because the section does not preclude judicial intervention 
where the FDIC acts in its corporate capacity. Thus, 
appellants would have us interpret section 1821(j) to 
preclude only those orders directly against the FDIC as 
receiver or as conservator. 
 
We find, however, that the plain language of the statute 
is not so limited. Rather, the statute, by its terms, can 
preclude relief even against a third party, including the 
FDIC in its corporate capacity, where the result is such 
that the relief "restrain[s] or affect[s] the exercise of powers 
or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver." 
12 U.S.C. S 1821(j) (emphasis added). After all, an action 
can "affect" the exercise of powers by an agency without 
being aimed directly at it. 
 
We note that our holding is not inconsistent with our 
decision in Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 397, 400 (3d Cir. 
1991).9 In Rosa, we did not decide the reach of section 
1821(j) because the RTC conceded that the anti-injunction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. This provision applies equally to the RTC. Thus, in considering the 
scope of section 1821(j)'s bar of equitable relief, courts refer to and 
rely 
upon cases involving the RTC and the FDIC interchangeably. See 
Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 112 n.6 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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provision did not preclude the district court orders running 
against it in its corporate capacity. See Rosa, 938 F.2d at 
397, 400. Thus, Rosa did not hold that section 1821(j) 
allows an injunction against the FDIC in its corporate 
capacity. Further, because the court did not discuss the 
issue, the nature of the district court orders running 
against the RTC in its corporate capacity is not clear; thus, 
it is unclear whether the order running against the RTC in 
its corporate capacity would have had the type of effect we 
now describe. We, therefore, find that Rosa does not control 
the issue which we now confront. 
 
Likewise, we note that the opinions of other courts of 
appeals do not speak directly to the issue at hand. See 
Bursik v. One Fourth St. N., Ltd., 84 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (the section applies only if the RTC is acting in 
its capacity as receiver); Fischer v. RTC, 59 F.3d 1344, 1347 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting in dicta that courts have 
interpreted the section not to apply where the FDIC is 
acting in its corporate, as opposed to its receiver or 
conservator, capacity); Sierra Club v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 
548-51 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court could enjoin 
the FDIC because it was acting in its corporate capacity). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has indicated 
quite clearly that a court order which operates against a 
third party is precluded by section 1821(j) if the order 
would have the same effect from the FDIC's perspective as 
a direct action against it precluded by section 1821(j). See 
Telematics Int'l, Inc. v. NEMCL Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 
707 (1st Cir. 1992). The Telematics court held that the 
district court could not enjoin the FDIC from foreclosing on 
a security interest. See id. at 705. But the court went 
further and also stated the following: 
 
       Telematics argues that even if the district court lacked 
       the power to enjoin the FDIC from attaching the 
       certificate of deposit held by Fleet Bank, the court 
       nevertheless maintained the authority to allow 
       Telematics to attach the certificate of deposit. The 
       district court concluded that it lacked such authority, 
       and we agree. Permitting Telematics to attach the 
       certificate of deposit, if that attachment were effective 
       against the FDIC, would have the same effect, from the 
 
                                18 
  
       FDIC's perspective, as directly enjoining the FDIC from 
       attaching the asset. In either event, the district court 
       would restrain or affect the FDIC in the exercise of its 
       powers as receiver. Section 1821(j) prohibits such a 
       result. 
 
Id. at 707 (emphasis added). We agree with the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit's pragmatic suggestion that 
section 1821(j) precludes a court order against a third party 
which would affect the FDIC as receiver, particularly where 
the relief would have the same practical result as an order 
directed against the FDIC in that capacity. 
 
The relief appellants seek in this case clearly would 
"affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as 
conservator or receiver." Appellants' Count IV seeks a 
declaration that the Notification was void ab initio and a 
rescission thereof. Because the FDIC's findings directly and 
proximately caused the Secretary to close Meritor, the 
appellants also seek the imposition of a constructive trust 
as of the date Meritor was seized. Here, the requested relief 
against the FDIC-Corporate clearly would affect the FDIC's 
continued functioning as receiver and it effectively would 
throw into question every act of FDIC-Receiver. 
 
Our opinion, however, should not be overread. The 
affecting of the powers of the FDIC-Receiver in this case, 
which appellants' requested relief would cause, if granted, 
would be dramatic and fundamental. We do not suggest 
that we would reach the same result in a case in which the 
effect on the FDIC of an order against a third party would 
be of little consequence to its overall functioning as 
receiver. That type of situation is not before us. 
 
We reject appellants' contention that section 1818(j) 
cannot be interpeted to bar their constitutional claims 
because Congress did not express a clear intent for the 
section to preclude review of constitutional claims. See 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2053 
(1988). The Webster Court noted that this heightened 
standard is intended to avoid the "serious constitutional 
question" which would result if a court interpreted a federal 
statute so as to deny all judicial review of a constitutional 
claim. See id. at 603, 108 S.Ct. at 2053. Our interpretation 
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of section 1821(j) only denies appellants the declaratory 
and injunctive relief they now seek, but does not deny them 
judicial review for their constitutional claims. Courts 
uniformly have held that the preclusion of section 1821(j) 
does not affect a damages claim. See, e.g., Sharpe v. FDIC, 
126 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997); Volges v. RTC, 32 
F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1994); RPM Investments, Inc. v. RTC, 
75 F.3d 618, 622 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, our holding does 
not deny appellants a judicial remedy for an appropriate 
damages claim.10 
 
b. Availability of APA Review 
 
Even if we agreed that section 1821(j) did not preclude 
the relief appellants seek, we would affirm the district 
court's dismissal of their claim for review under the APA 
because such review is not available in this instance. The 
APA grants a right of judicial review of an agency action to 
"[a] person suffering legal wrong because of any agency 
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action 
within the meaning of a relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. S 702. 
This right of review, however, is limited. First, the APA only 
provides for review of those actions "made reviewable by 
statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. S 704. Second, the 
APA withdraws the right of review "to the extent that 
statutes preclude judicial review." 5 U.S.C. S 701(a)(1). 
 
We find that the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We recognize that the defendants in such an action might be able to 
assert various defenses but our concern here is only with the statute we 
are construing. This is also the circumstance in other places in the 
opinion in which we recognize the possibility of the bringing of a 
damages action. 
 
In fact, shareholders of Meritor have brought a damages action in the 
United States Court of Federal Claims against the United States 
predicated on the alleged wrongful issuance of the Notification. See 
Slattery v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 180 (1996). According to appellants 
this action is still pending and is predicated both on constitutional and 
breach of contract principles. Br. at 15-16. The Court of Federal Claims 
rather than this court will make the determination of what effect, if any, 
this opinion has in that litigation. 
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review the FDIC-Corporate's issuance of the Notification 
because (1) it was not a final agency action, and (2) review 
expressly is barred by 12 U.S.C. S 1818(i)(1) and 
jurisdiction therefore is withdrawn pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
S 701(a)(1). 
 
The APA provides for review of a "final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," 5 
U.S.C. S 704, but the APA does not define what constitutes 
a "final" agency action. The Supreme Court has stated that 
the "core question is whether the agency has completed its 
decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that 
process is one that will directly affect the parties." Franklin 
v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773 
(1992). The action must be a "definitive statement of [the 
agency's] position" with concrete legal consequences. FTC v. 
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 241, 101 S.Ct. 488, 493 
(1980); see also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 144, 113 
S.Ct. 2539, 2543 (1993). We have held that "thefinality of 
[an agency action] is determined by its consequences" or its 
practical effects. Shea v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 
F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir. 1991); see also In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 
911, 923 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
FDIC-Corporate issued Meritor a Notification which 
stated that, as a result of the grand-fathered goodwill no 
longer being considered in Meritor's capital base, Meritor 
was undercapitalized and in violation of the FDIC 
agreement. In the Notification, the FDIC also notified 
Meritor that procedures would be initiated to cancel 
Meritor's deposit insurance if Meritor did not come into 
immediate compliance with certain capital requirements. 
Based upon this information, the Secretary closed Meritor 
the same day that FDIC-Corporate issued the Notification.11 
 
We agree with FDIC-Corporate that the Notification at 
issue here was "the first step in a multi-step statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Secretary presumably acted pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, 
S 733-504(B) (West 1990), which states, in relevant part, that the 
Secretary need not conduct a hearing prior to taking possession of a 
financial institution "whenever immediate action shall be necessary in 
order to protect the interests of the depositors, other creditors, or 
shareholders of an institution." 
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procedure which must be followed when FDIC-Corporate 
considers terminating an institution's deposit insurance." 
Br. of Appellee FDIC-Corporate at 12; see also 12 U.S.C. 
S 1818(a)(2). After such a notification is issued, to terminate 
an institution's deposit insurance, the FDIC also, inter alia, 
must give notice of a hearing and conduct a hearing 
pursuant to statutory requirements. See 12 U.S.C. 
S 1818(a). In the context of this statutory procedure, the 
issuance of the Notification does not represent the FDIC's 
definitive statement regarding the termination of a financial 
institution's insurance status. 
 
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Trade Commission's ("FTC") issuance of a complaint was 
not a final agency action and therefore was not reviewable 
under the APA. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 238, 101 
S.Ct. at 492. The Court reasoned that the complaint was, 
by its terms, not a definitive statement; rather, the 
complaint only was indicative of a "reason to believe" that 
the party was violating the law. See id. at 241, 101 S.Ct. at 
493-94. The Court found that the complaint was a 
determination that an administrative proceeding would be 
commenced but did not have the legal force or practical 
effect on the party's daily business activities indicative of a 
final agency determination. See id., 101 S.Ct. at 494. The 
Court noted that the finality requirement has been 
interpreted "in a pragmatic way." See id. at 239, 101 S.Ct. 
at 493. 
 
We find that the issuance of the Notification was not the 
FDIC's definitive statement. See id. at 241, 101 S.Ct. at 
493. Furthermore, the issuance of the Notification did not 
have the type of effect we described and required in Shea v. 
Office of Thrift Supervision to be a final, reviewable action, 
namely that the agency action must be one that "impose[s] 
an obligation, den[ies] a right, or fix[es] some legal 
relationship as a consummation of the administrative 
process." Shea, 934 F.2d at 44. Rather, the action that had 
legal effect was the Secretary's decision to close the bank, 
not the FDIC's issuance of the Notification. 
 
We also agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which has held that where a state actor relies upon 
a federal agency's notice, the state action does not convert 
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the notice into a final agency act under the APA. See Air 
California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 654 F.2d 616, 
621 (9th Cir. 1981). In Air California, the Orange County 
Board of Supervisors ("Board") had adopted a policy 
designed to freeze the level of operations at the Orange 
County Airport. See id. at 618. This policy resulted in the 
exclusion of new carriers, ultimately inuring to the benefit 
of Air California, an existing carrier at the airport. See id. 
 
Thereafter, the Board entered into agreements with the 
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") to gain federal 
airport funds, thereby subjecting the airport to federal 
regulations. See id. The FAA held a hearing to investigate 
allegations by carriers who unsuccessfully had applied for 
authorization to use the airport that the airport policy 
violated federal law. See id. Following an investigatory 
hearing, the FAA's Chief Counsel sent a letter to the Board 
warning that failure to comply with federal regulations 
would result in the FAA pursuing sanctions, but that no 
formal action would be taken for 30 days. See id. The FAA 
never took formal action, but as a result of the letter to the 
Board, the Board met and decided to reallocate theflights 
to include additional carriers, thereby reducing the number 
of flights for which Air California was authorized. See id. Air 
California then sought APA review of the FAA letter. See id. 
The court held that the letter was not a final agency order 
because the Board's action, not the FAA letter, immediately 
affected Air California's rights. See id. at 621. 
 
We reject appellants' attempt to distinguish Standard Oil 
and Air California; according to appellants, these cases are 
distinguishable because of the conspiracy the appellants 
allege existed here. While appellants acknowledge that the 
Notification could have been the beginning of an internal 
adjudicative process, as in Standard Oil, they argue that 
this possibility is immaterial in this factual context. Here, 
appellants contend that the Notification was not intended 
to commence an administrative investigation. They assert 
that by virtue of the alleged conspiracy, the FDIC knew and 
intended that the Secretary would close Meritor 
immediately when he received the Notification. Appellants 
also argue that the complicity involved distinguishes the 
FDIC's Notification from the FAA letter in Air California 
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because the FDIC issued the Notification knowing and 
intending it directly to affect Meritor. In addition, appellants 
assert that because the FDIC specifically targeted Meritor 
whereas the FAA directed its attention to the Board, not to 
the plaintiffs therein, there is a more direct effect on 
Meritor associated with the FDIC's action than there was on 
the plaintiff in Air California by reason of the challenged 
action in that case. 
 
We acknowledge that the Secretary's closing of Meritor 
precluded the need for a final agency action terminating 
Meritor's insured status. However, appellants' failure to 
challenge the appointment of the receiver under the 
available state procedure, see Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733- 
605 (West 1990), does not convert the Notification, an 
otherwise preliminary step in FDIC procedure, into afinal 
agency action reviewable under 5 U.S.C. S 704. 
 
APA review is unavailable in this case also because 12 
U.S.C. S 1818(i) precludes judicial review of the Notification, 
and the APA does not allow judicial review where another 
statute specifically prohibits it, see 5 U.S.C. S 701(a)(1). 
Section 1818(i) precludes review of orders and notices 
except as specifically provided elsewhere in section 1818. 
Section 1818(i)(1) provides in relevant part that 
 
       except as otherwise provided in this section . . . no 
       court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or 
       otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or 
       order under any such section, or to review, modify, 
       suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or 
       order. 
 
The Supreme Court has found that this language is clear. 
See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp. 
Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39, 112 S.Ct. 459, 463 (1991). In 
MCorp, the Court held that section 1818(i)(1) "provides us 
with clear and convincing evidence that Congress intended 
to deny the District Court jurisdiction to review and enjoin 
the Board's ongoing administrative proceedings." MCorp, 
502 U.S. at 44, 112 S.Ct. at 466; see also Groos Nat'l Bank 
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 895 (5th Cir. 
1978) (noting that the section "in particular evinces a clear 
intention that this regulatory process is not to be disturbed 
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by untimely judicial intervention, at least where there is no 
`clear departure from statutory authority' "). 
 
The question we now face is whether the section 1818(i) 
applies only where there is such an ongoing administrative 
proceeding. As discussed above, here there is no such 
proceeding because the Secretary's decision to close Meritor 
based upon the Notification eviscerated the need for further 
proceedings to terminate Meritor's insured status. 
Moreover, to our knowledge, the only case law involving 
section 1818(i) is in the context of an ongoing 
administrative proceeding. 
 
Yet the plain language of section 1818(i) broadly 
precludes the review of the issuance of any notice under 
any subsection. See 12 U.S.C. S 1818(i)(1); Henry v. Office 
of Thrift Supervision, 43 F.3d 507, 512 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting contention that the "orders" referred to in section 
1818(i) are limited to those issued after administrative 
hearings). Further, while section 1818 provides for review of 
certain notices and orders, such as those issued after a 
hearing, see 12 U.S.C. S 1818(a)(5) (providing for review of 
an order terminating an institution's insured status); 12 
U.S.C. S 1818(h) (providing for review of orders and notices 
issued after required hearings), it does not provide for 
review of the issuance of this Notification, which was issued 
pursuant to section 1818(a)(1). Thus, by its terms section 
1818(i) applies to this case and is not restricted to 
precluding judicial review which would interfere with an 
ongoing administrative proceeding. Based upon this plain 
meaning, we conclude that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to review the issuance of the Notification. 
 
Courts, however, have recognized a limited exception to a 
statute's specific withdrawal of jurisdiction where the 
plaintiff claims that the agency acted in a blatantly lawless 
manner or contrary to a clear statutory prohibition. See, 
e.g., Abercrombie v. Office of the Comptroller of Currency, 
833 F.2d 672, 674-75 (7th Cir. 1987); First Nat'l Bank of 
Grayson v. Conover, 715 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1983); 
Groos Nat'l Bank, 573 F.2d at 895. The roots of this so- 
called "statutory-authority" exception are in Leedom v. 
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 79 S.Ct. 180 (1958). 
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The Supreme Court has considered the application of this 
exception to section 1818(i). See Board of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 112 
S.Ct. 459. In MCorp, the Court declined to apply the 
exception, distinguishing it in two respects from the 
situation in Kyne. First, the Court found that there were 
adequate means of review available upon a final 
determination by the agency. Second, the Court held that 
Kyne did not apply because there the preclusion was 
implied from congressional silence, whereas the preclusion 
of section 1818(i) was express and clear. See id. at 43-44, 
112 S.Ct. at 465-66. 
 
We recently have addressed the "statutory-authority" 
exception and emphasized that an integral factor in 
determining the applicability of the exception is the clarity 
of the statutory preclusion. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. 
EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1928-29 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(citing Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp 
Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 112 S.Ct. 459; Briscoe v. Bell, 432 
U.S. 404, 97 S.Ct. 2428 (1977)), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 687 
(1998). In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that review was 
available under Kyne, in Clinton County we held that, as 
with section 1818(i), the section precluding review provided 
" `clear and convincing evidence' . . . that Congress intended 
to deny the district court jurisdiction to review EPA's 
ongoing remedial action." Clinton County, 116 F.3d at 1029. 
 
We find that this exception does not apply to this case 
primarily for two reasons. First, the exception does not 
apply in the face of such clear preclusive language. Second, 
the FDIC did not act in a blatantly lawless manner. 
Although appellants may object to the FDIC's conclusions, 
the FDIC acted pursuant to the requirement that it notify 
a financial institution upon making a determination that 
the financial institution was operating in an unsafe 
financial condition. See 12 U.S.C. S 1818(a)(2). 
 
We have not overlooked the appellants' arguments 
regarding the effect of our interpretation of the 
jurisdictional bar. First, they argue that where, as here, the 
FDIC knowingly acts to eliminate section 1818 
administrative review, section 1818(i)(1) cannot preclude 
judicial review, because the effect would be to preclude all 
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review of the issuance of the Notification. We reject this 
contention because the result of our holding with respect to 
the preclusion of section 1818(i) is to bar only APA review 
of the FDIC's issuance of the Notification. We are not moved 
by the lack of a remedy under the APA because section 
1818(i) only precludes court action which would "affect by 
injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement" of the 
Notification. We see no reason why, under proper 
circumstances, a plaintiff could not institute, and a district 
court could not entertain, an action for damages based 
upon the FDIC's allegedly wrongful conduct without 
offending section 1818(i). 
 
Second, appellants argue that that we should not 
construe section 1818(i)(1) to bar their constitutional claims 
because Congress clearly must express an intent to 
preclude review of constitutional claims. See Webster, 486 
U.S. at 603, 108 S.Ct. at 2053. We reject this argument for 
the same reasons that we rejected it above in the context of 
the jurisdiction bar of section 1821(j). Again, section 
1818(i)(1) precludes the declaratory and injunctive relief 
sought here, but on its face would not affect an appropriate 
constitutional claim for damages. 
 
4. Due Process Claim Against Secretary 
 
We now turn to the claim in Count I against the 
Secretary which seeks a declaration of the 
unconstitutionality of the Secretary's order closing Meritor 
and a rescission thereof. As noted above, we will treat this 
claim as one based upon section 1983 against the 
Secretary in his official capacity. On appeal, the Secretary 
raises an Eleventh Amendment objection to this claim. For 
the reasons we discuss below, we recognize but need not 
reach the Eleventh Amendment issue raised by this claim 
because we find that the district court correctly dismissed 
this claim as barred by 12 U.S.C. S 1821(j). 
 
In general, the Eleventh Amendment prevents suits in 
federal court against states, or state officials if the state is 
the real party in interest. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department 
of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 350 (1945). 
The Amendment, however, does not bar such suits where 
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the state has waived its immunity, see Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145 
(1985), Congress validly has abrogated the state's immunity 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Seminole Tribe of 
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996), or the 
well-established exception of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
28 S.Ct. 441 (1908), applies. 
 
Of these narrow exceptions, the only one that arguably 
applies in this case is that under Young. The principle 
which emerges from Young and its progeny is that a state 
official sued in his official capacity for prospective 
injunctive relief is a person within section 1983, and the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar such a suit. See Hafer 
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27, 112 S.Ct. 358, 362-63 (1991); Will 
v. Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10, 109 
S.Ct. 2304, 2312 n.10 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham , 473 
U.S. 159, 167 n.14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106 n.14 (1985) 
("[O]fficial-capacity actions for prospective relief are not 
treated as actions against the State.") (citing Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441). 
 
Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this claim 
against the Secretary, provided that the relief appellants 
seek properly is construed as "prospective injunctive relief" 
or is ancillary to such relief. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 
332, 347-49, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1148-49 (1979). The type of 
prospective relief permitted under Young is relief intended 
to prevent a continuing violation of federal law. See Puerto 
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 688 (1993) (the Young 
exception "does not permit judgments against state officers 
declaring that they violated federal law in the past"); 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 
2940 (1986) (the focus of the Young exception is on 
addressing ongoing violations of federal law). 
 
Appellants seek threefold relief against the Secretary: (1) 
a declaration that the Secretary's order closing Meritor was 
unconstitutional; (2) a rescission of the Secretary's order 
closing Meritor; and (3) the imposition of a constructive 
trust nunc pro tunc. We, however, need not reach the issue 
of whether that relief would be prospective because we 
recognize that we need not decide difficult jurisdictional 
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issues where we can decide the case on another dispositive 
issue in favor of the party who would benefit by a ruling 
that we do not have jurisdiction. See Georgine v. Amchem 
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Norton 
v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 528, 530-33, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 2774-76 
(1976); Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992)), 
aff'd sub nom., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 
2231 (1997). 
 
Although the issue here involves the application of the 
Eleventh Amendment rather than subject matter 
jurisdiction, we find that the issue "sufficiently partakes of 
the nature of a jurisdictional bar" to justify our application 
of the principle recognized in Georgine. See College Sav. 
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1363 (1974)). 
Moreover, like the jurisdictional issues avoided in Georgine, 
questions under the Eleventh Amendment issue are 
constitutional in scope. Courts, of course, will avoid such 
questions where possible. See, e.g., Spector Motor Servs., 
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154 
(1944). 
 
Largely for the reasons we stated above regarding the 
scope of section 1821(j), we agree with the district court 
that section 1821(j) would bar the declaratory and 
injunctive relief sought against the Secretary. As discussed 
above, section 1821(j) precludes injunctive and declaratory 
relief which would restrain or affect the powers of the FDIC 
as receiver, even where that relief is directed against a third 
party. See Telematics, 967 F.2d at 707. Rescinding the 
order closing Meritor clearly would have essentially the 
same effect on FDIC-Receiver as would an order directly 
enjoining the FDIC from continuing to act as receiver. 
 
Appellants urge that relief is warranted and not 
precluded by section 1821(j) where, as here, the gravamen 
of the complaint is that the appointment of the receiver was 
improper, not that the FDIC was exercising its duties as 
receiver improperly. We distinguish James Madison Ltd. v. 
Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
S.Ct. 737 (1997),12 upon which appellants rely for this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The district court did not consider the applicability of James Madison 
because the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided 
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proposition. In James Madison, the plaintiffs challenged the 
appointment of the FDIC as receiver of two national banks 
and requested "an injunction removing the FDIC as 
receiver; returning bank assets . . .; restoring the banks' 
charters to allow them to resume business; and returning 
the banks' files." Id. at 1091. The court rejected the FDIC's 
claim that the requested relief violated section 1821(j), 
reasoning that 
 
       [u]ntil now, this circuit has not considered whether 
       section 1821(j) precludes federal courts from granting 
       injunctive or declaratory relief if the [regulators] 
       improperly appointed the FDIC receiver of a national 
       bank. In our view, section 1821 does no such thing. 
       Section 1821(j) states only that courts cannot `restrain 
       or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the 
       [FDIC] as a conservator or receiver.' . . . It does not 
       address federal court power to set aside an illegal 
       appointment of a conservator or receiver. Congress 
       knows the difference between judicial power to restrain 
       an agency properly acting as a receiver and judicial 
       power to remove an improperly appointed agency. 
 
Id. at 1093. Thus, the court concluded that section 1821(j) 
bars a court from "interfering with the FDIC only when the 
agency acts within the scope of its authorized powers, not 
when the agency was improperly appointed in thefirst 
place." Id. 
 
We conclude that James Madison is inapplicable here. 
The James Madison court held that the anti-injunction 
provision of section 1821(j) did not bar an APA challenge to 
the appointment of a receiver for a national bank. The court 
first noted that there is no statutory provision which 
specifically provides for the review of the appointment of a 
receiver for a national bank while there is such a specific 
provision for others. See James Madison, 82 F.3d at 1092. 
Compare 12 U.S.C. S 191 (appointment of receiver to a 
national bank) with 12 U.S.C. S 203(b) (judicial review of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that case after the district court dismissed appellants' claims, except 
for 
those against the Secretary in his individual capacity and the Doe 
defendants. 
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the appointment of a conservator of a national bank); 12 
U.S.C. S 1464(d)(2)(E) (judicial review of an appointment by 
the Director of Office of Thrift Supervision of conservator or 
receiver); 12 U.S.C. S 1821(c)(7) (judicial review where the 
FDIC appoints itself as receiver or conservator of a state 
chartered institution); 12 U.S.C. S 1787(a)(1)(B) (review of 
appointment of National Credit Union Board as liquidating 
agent for insured credit union). The court held that section 
1821(j) did not clearly bar such review and review of the 
appointment under the APA was therefore proper. See 
James Madison, 82 F.3d at 1094. Thus, the court in James 
Madison predicated its holding allowing review under the 
APA on the lack of an adequate remedy. 
 
We decline to apply the rationale of James Madison here 
for two reasons. First, APA review of the appointment of the 
FDIC as receiver is not proper here because the 
appointment was not made by a federal agency, but rather 
by the Secretary, a state official. Second, James Madison 
concerned receiverships of national banks, whereas Meritor 
was a state-chartered bank, and there is or was another 
available procedure for review of the appointment in this 
case. See Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733-605 (West 1990). 
 
Federal law explicitly provides for judicial review of the 
appointment of a receiver or conservator in certain specific 
instances where a receiver or conservator is appointed by a 
federal actor. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. S 203(b) (providing for 
judicial review of the appointment of a conservator of a 
national bank within 20 days of the appointment); 12 
U.S.C. S 1464(d)(2)(B) (providing for judicial review of an 
appointment by the Director of Office of Thrift Supervision 
within 30 days of the appointment); 12 U.S.C. S 1821(c)(7) 
(providing for judicial review within 30 days of the 
appointment where the FDIC appoints itself as receiver or 
conservator of a state chartered institution); 12 U.S.C. 
S 1787(a)(1)(B) (providing for judicial review within ten days 
of the appointment of National Credit Union Board as 
liquidating agent for insured credit union). Courts have 
held that where a plaintiff has not pursued these remedies 
to challenge the appointment of a receiver or conservator, a 
subsequent action outside the applicable limitation period 
is barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See 
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Lafayette Fed. Credit Union v. National Credit Union Admin., 
960 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff'd, ___ F.3d ___ 
(4th Cir. 1998) (table). 
 
The same principle applies here where there is an 
adequate state procedure available to challenge the 
appointment of a receiver by the Secretary.13 In closing 
Meritor, the Secretary acted pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 
71, S 733-504B (West 1990), so that his action was subject 
to review under Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733-605 (West 
1990), which provides that "[a]ny institution whose 
business or property the secretary has taken possession as 
receiver, may, at any time within ten days after the 
secretary has become receiver, apply to the court for an 
order requiring the secretary to show cause why he should 
not be enjoined from continuing as receiver." This state 
procedure is consistent with the federal policy of requiring 
a swift challenge to the appointment of a receiver. See, e.g., 
12 U.S.C. S 203(b) (providing 20 days to seek judicial 
review); 12 U.S.C. S 1464(d)(2)(B) (providing 30 days to seek 
judicial review); 12 U.S.C. S 1821(c)(7) (providing 30 days to 
seek judicial review); 12 U.S.C. S 1787(a)(1)(B) (providing 
ten days to seek judicial review). 
 
The district court refused to require the appellants to 
have availed themselves of the state procedure because it 
concluded that such a requirement effectively would permit 
a state statute to foreclose appellants' constitutional claims. 
In so holding, the district court apparently conceived of 
such a requirement as imposing a 10-day statute of 
limitations on any claim relating to the seizure of the bank.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Appellants suggested at oral argument that the statute does not 
apply here because it only provides for review where the Secretary is 
appointed as receiver. Tr. of oral arg. at 10-11. We recognize that there 
is scarce case law interpreting Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733-605, but we 
see no reason why the Pennsylvania statute would not apply where the 
Secretary has designated another to act as receiver. 
 
14. Citing Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733-605, the district court stated 
that 
"[t]he defendants have asserted a number of arguments in support of 
their individual motions, foremost among them the claim that the 
plaintiffs are barred from pursuing their constitutional claims here 
because of the ten day limitation on applying for court orders placed by 
Pennsylvania law." The district court found "that the plaintiffs are not 
prejudiced in their ability to bring their constitutional claims here by 
the 
law in Pennsylvania" but left open the possibility that "the defenses of 
waiver, estoppel, or laches may be raised at a later date." 
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Once again, we emphasize the limits of our holding. We 
hold that section 1821(j) precludes the relief sought here, 
namely a rescission of the Secretary's appointment of a 
receiver, because it would wholly prevent the FDIC from 
continuing as receiver, where there is an adequate 
procedure available to challenge the appointment of a 
receiver. As we state elsewhere in this opinion, this holding 
is based upon section 1821(j)'s preclusion of remedies and 
does not foreclose the possibility of proper constitutional 
claims seeking other remedies.15 
 
We also find inapplicable the case law cited by appellants 
in which courts have declined to apply certain state 
procedural requirements to plaintiffs asserting federal civil 
rights actions in federal court. See Felder v. Casey, 487 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Appellants' also argue that an action pursuant to Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 
71, S 733-605 could not be brought in federal court because the statute 
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in state court. This argument does not 
alter our conclusion. 
 
First, appellants are incorrect in their blanket assertion that the 
statute vests exclusive jurisdiction in state court. Although the statute 
provides that a party must make application to "the court," which is 
defined as "[t]he court of common pleas in the county in which the 
corporation or person has its principal or only place of business in the 
Commonwealth; or, where an institution of which this Secretary is 
receiver is concerned, the particular court in which the certificate of 
possession . . . is filed," see Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, S 733-2 (West 
1990), 
a state statute cannot be applied so as to limit a federal court's 
supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Scott v. School Dist. No. 6, 815 F. 
Supp. 424, 429 (D. Wyo. 1993) (holding that state statute which 
purported to establish exclusive jurisdiction in state court is 
unconstitutional to extent it preclude federal courts from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims). Thus, for example, if a 
plaintiff instituted a proper damages suit in federal court within ten 
days 
of the appointment of a receiver by the Secretary, the state statute could 
not be interpreted to preclude the federal court from exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over an action under Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 71, 
S 733-605. 
 
Second, we acknowledge that our example is not realistic in many 
cases given the brevity of the time period in the state statute. We see no 
reason, however, why our conclusion should be altered by the fact that 
an action to challenge the appointment of the receiver pursuant to the 
state procedure ordinarily would not be in federal court. 
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U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302 (1988) (notice of claim statute); 
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50-55, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 
2929-32 (1984) (state statute of limitations); Patsy v. Board 
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568 (1982) 
(holding that a civil rights plaintiff need not exhaust state 
administrative remedies). These cases are inapposite 
because the Court based the holdings on the notion that 
state laws or requirements which are inconsistent with 
federal law or its objectives are subordinated to the federal 
law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. As the Felder Court 
noted, applying a state statute of limitations which provides 
only a truncated period in which to file an action in civil 
rights cases "inadequately accommodate[s] the complexities 
of federal civil rights litigation." Felder, 487 U.S. at 140, 
108 S.Ct. at 2307. 
 
Here, requiring appellants to have availed themselves of 
the Pennsylvania procedure to challenge the Secretary's 
taking of possession of the bank would not undermine 
federal policy. To the contrary, as we noted above, the state 
requirement is consistent with the federal policy of 
requiring swift objection to the appointment of a receiver. 
 
C. ENFORCEMENT OF FDIC's STATUTORY 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
The district court also dismissed Counts V and VI, in 
which appellants sought to enforce certain statutory duties 
of the FDIC. We affirm the dismissal of these counts 
because there is no implied private right of action to enforce 
the FDIC's duty to maximize gain and minimize loss in its 
disposition of assets and the shareholders have no 
enforceable right to an accurate accounting. 
 
1. FDIC's Duty to Maximize Gain and Minimize Loss in 
       its Disposition of Assets 
 
In its September 6, 1995 order,16 the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The district court initially dismissed this claim, embodied in Count V 
of appellants' First Amended Complaint, for lack of jurisdiction by order 
dated February 28, 1995. The district court held that the appellants had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Shortly thereafter, the 
court reinstated the claim after appellants completed their pursuit of 
those procedures. Therefore, the September 6, 1995 disposition of this 
claim is the subject of this appeal. 
 
                                34 
  
dismissed appellants' claim for money damages for the 
FDIC-Receiver's alleged failure to comply with its statutory 
duty to maximize the gain and minimize the loss in the 
disposition of Meritor's assets. See 12 U.S.C. 
S 1821(d)(13)(E).17 The district court held that this provision 
neither expressly nor impliedly grants a private right of 
action to individual shareholders.18 See exhibit B to 
appellant's brief. 
 
The standard announced in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 
S.Ct. 2080 (1975), guides our inquiry into whether section 
1821(d)(13)(E) impliedly grants shareholders of a failed 
financial institution a private right of action to enforce the 
FDIC-Receiver's statutory obligations. In Cort, the Court 
announced that courts should consider the following four 
factors to determine whether a statute impliedly grants a 
private right of action: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Section 1821(d)(13)(E) provides: 
 
       In exercising any right, power, privilege, or authority as 
conservator 
       or receiver in connection with any sale or disposition of assets of 
       any insured depository institution for which the Corporation has 
       been appointed conservator or receiver, including any sale or 
       disposition of assets acquired by the Corporation under section 
       1823(d)(1) of this title, the Corporation shall conduct its 
operations 
       in a manner which-- 
 
       (i) maximizes the net present value return from the sale or 
       disposition of such assets; 
 
       (ii) minimizes the amount of any loss realized in the resolution of 
       cases; 
 
       (iii) ensures adequate competition and fair and consistent 
treatment 
       of offerors; 
 
       (iv) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or ethnic 
       groups in the solicitation and consideration of offers; and 
 
       (v) maximizes the preservation of the availability and 
affordability of 
       residential real property for low- and moderate-income individuals. 
 
18. Appropriately, appellants do not appeal the district court's decision 
to the extent that the court held that the statute does not expressly 
grant appellants a private right of action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485 (1979) (holding that 
a right of action must be clear from the text of the statute). 
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of the class for whose special benefit the statute was 
created; (2) whether there is either an explicit or implicit 
legislative intent to create or deny a private remedy; (3) 
whether an implied remedy is consistent with underlying 
policies of the statute; and (4) whether the cause of action 
is one that traditionally is relegated to state law and the 
area is a state concern so that it would be inappropriate to 
imply a federal cause of action. See id. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 
2088. 
 
In deciding whether to recognize an implied private right 
of action, we ascertain the intent of Congress;"[u]nless 
such `congressional intent can be inferred from the 
language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some 
other source, the essential predicate for implication of a 
private remedy simply does not exist.' " Karahalios v. 
National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 
527, 532-33, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 1286 (1989) (quoting 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 
516 (1988)). Thus, we recently have noted that we should 
focus our inquiry on the first two Cort factors. See 
Mallenbaum v. Adelphia Communications Corp., 74 F.3d 
465, 469 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Appellants contend that the district court erred by failing 
to give proper consideration of two circumstances which 
distinguish this case from others involving receiverships: (1) 
the existence of a surplus in the Meritor receivership; and 
(2) the appellants, as shareholders, have an express 
statutory right to distribution of this surplus. According to 
appellants, in the context of a receivership operating with a 
surplus, the Cort factors are met and thus we should imply 
the existence of a private right of action in their favor. 
 
We disagree. Our analysis of the Cort factors, with an 
emphasis on the first two, see Mallenbaum, 74 F.3d at 469, 
leads us to the conclusion that there is no evidence of a 
congressional intent to provide for a private remedy. 
Because such intent is our ultimate guidepost, wefind that 
the shareholders of a failed financial institution do not have 
a private right of enforcement of the FDIC's duty to 
maximize gain and minimize loss in its disposition of the 
institution's assets. 
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First, appellants, as shareholders, are not members of a 
class for whose special benefit Congress created section 
1821(d)(13)(E). The duty to maximize gain in the disposition 
of assets has implications broader than to benefit 
shareholders. The FDIC's duty to maximize gain and 
minimize loss primarily is intended to benefit the insurance 
fund by minimizing the claims against it, thereby reducing 
the cost to the taxpayers. Thus, the benefits gained by the 
shareholders and other claimants are incidental to the 
primary intended beneficiaries, the insurance fund and the 
taxpayers. See FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 455 n.59 
& 456 (N.D. Tex. 1993); FDIC v. Updike Bros., Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. 1035, 1041-42 (D. Wyo. 1993). 
 
In a similar context, we have noted that the FDIC does 
not have a duty to shareholders. See First State Bank of 
Hudson County v. United States, 599 F.2d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 
1979). In Hudson County, we held that the FDIC's duty to 
examine banks, see 12 U.S.C. S 1820, is intended to 
prevent losses which ultimately would result in claims 
against the insurance fund. See id. at 562-63. We also 
noted that while the examination incidentally might benefit 
the bank, its depositors, and its creditors, the primary 
purpose of the examination is to safeguard the insurance 
fund. See id. at 563. Further, our conclusion is supported 
by evidence in the legislative history that Congress was 
concerned with reducing the costs to taxpayers. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 101-54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 514-15, 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 308-09. 
 
In addition, the duty to maximize gain and minimize loss 
does not operate for the special benefit of shareholders 
where the receivership is operating with a surplus. Section 
1821(d)(11)(B) establishes a shareholder right to 
distribution of funds in a case where there is a surplus 
after the payment of all claimants and administrative 
expenses.19 Given this right to distribution, appellants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The text of the section provides: 
 
       In any case in which funds remain after the depositors, creditors, 
       other claimants, and administrative expenses are paid, the receiver 
       shall distribute such funds to the depository institution's 
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argue that the FDIC fulfills its statutory duty to maximize 
gain in order to preserve the surplus, thus for the sole 
benefit of the shareholders. We disagree. 
 
We recognize that the express right to distribution of 
surplus granted under section 1821(d)(11)(B) creates a 
direct interest in shareholders. See California Hous. Sec., 
Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 957 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting the argument that the shareholders did not have 
standing to claim an unconstitutional taking); Branch v. 
FDIC, 825 F. Supp. 384, 402-06 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding 
that shareholders of a failed financial institution have 
standing to assert derivative claims because they retain the 
right to distribution of surplus). This right, however, does 
not transform the FDIC's duty to maximize gain and 
minimize loss into one inuring solely to the benefit of the 
shareholders. The FDIC performs its section 1821(d)(13)(E) 
duty to maximize gain intending to reduce the claims 
against the insurance fund, not to ensure that shareholders 
receive distribution. 
 
Because the section clearly inures to the benefit of other 
classes, the first Cort factor militates strongly against 
granting a private remedy. Turning to the second Cort 
factor, the parties agree that there is no statement in the 
legislative history which suggests that Congress intended 
either to create or deny a private right of action to enforce 
the FDIC's duty to maximize gain and minimize loss. While 
congressional silence does not preclude a court from 
implying a private right of action where the other factors 
are satisfied, see Zeffiro v. First Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 623 
F.2d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 1980), here we find that the other 
factors do not support finding a private right of action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       shareholders or members together with the accounting report 
       required under paragraph (15)(B). 
 
12 U.S.C. S 1821(d)(11)(B). 
 
Although Congress recently amended this section, the amended 
provision only applies to institutions for which receivers were appointed 
after the enactment of the amendment. See Pub. L. No. 103-66, 
S 3001(a), 107 Stat. 312, 337 (1993). Thus, our discussion is governed 
by this version of this section prior to the 1993 amendment. 
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While we acknowledge that an action against a federal 
entity to enforce rights expressly granted under federal law 
traditionally is not relegated to state law, our inquiry ends 
upon our conclusion that the first two Cort factors are not 
met. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298, 101 
S.Ct. 1775, 1781 (1981) (noting that the second two factors 
"are only of relevance if the first two factors give indication 
of congressional intent to create the remedy"). 
 
2. FDIC's Duty to Provide Annual Accounting 
 
The district court dismissed appellants' claim for a full 
and fair accounting from the FDIC-Receiver, to which 
appellants alleged they were entitled under 12 U.S.C. 
S 1821(d)(15)(A)-(C). The court found that the FDIC-Receiver 
had complied with the literal requirements of the provision 
by providing a copy of the annual accounting report to 
appellants upon their request, and refused to engraft an 
enforceable duty to provide a correct accounting to 
shareholders. 
 
We again part with the district court's approach, but not 
its result. While the district court focused on whether an 
accuracy requirement is implicit in the statute, wefind the 
more appropriate inquiry to be whether the statute grants 
shareholders an implied private right of enforcement. We 
hold that it does not. 
 
The relevant portion of 12 U.S.C. S 1821(d)(15) provides: 
 
       (A) The Corporation as conservator or receiver shall, 
       consistent with the accounting and reporting practices 
       and procedures established by the Corporation, 
       maintain a full accounting of each conservatorship and 
       receivership or other disposition of institutions in 
       default. 
 
       (B) With respect to each conservatorship or 
       receivership to which the Corporation was appointed, 
       the Corporation shall make an annual accounting or 
       report, as appropriate, available to the Secretary of the 
       Treasury, the Comptroller General of the United States, 
       and the authority which appointed the Corporation as 
       conservator or receiver. 
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       (C) Any report prepared pursuant to subparagraph (B) 
       shall be made available by the Corporation upon 
       request to any shareholder of the depository institution 
       for which the Corporation was appointed conservator 
       or receiver or any other member of the public. 
 
Although appellants urge us to imply a requirement of 
accuracy, they cite no authority which directly supports 
this view. Rather, they cite analogous authority, which we 
find unpersuasive in this context. See First Nat'l Bank of 
Gordon v. Department of Treasury, 911 F.2d 57, 62-63 (8th 
Cir. 1990).20 Despite this lack of authority, we recognize 
that, in a practical sense, at some point the right to an 
accounting may be rendered meaningless if the accounting 
is not accurate. Nevertheless, even if we were to imply an 
accuracy requirement, we must affirm the district court's 
dismissal of this claim because our analysis of the Cort 
factors establishes that the shareholders do not have a 
private right of action to enforce the FDIC duty. 
 
The shareholders are not members of a special class for 
whose benefit the statute was created. Rather, the plain 
language of the statute puts shareholders on par with 
members of the general public. The statute gives 
shareholders and members of the public identical rights -- 
the FDIC must make the annual report available to either 
upon request -- and the statute establishes these rights in 
the same subsection. We see no reason, therefore, to 
distinguish between shareholders and members of the 
general public for purposes of this statute. 
 
Further, the legislative history is silent as to whether 
Congress intended to create a private remedy. Because the 
first two Cort factors are not satisfied, our inquiry ends 
here. See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298, 101 S.Ct. at 1781. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. In First National, the court addressed the interpretation of a statute 
which requires financial associations to make reports of condition in 
accordance with 12 U.S.C. S 1811 et seq. See 12 U.S.C. S 161(a). The 
court found that a bank violated section 161(a) where the report of its 
condition was not accurate. Section 161(a) includes a requirement that 
the report be accurate to the best knowledge and belief of the officers 
who sign it, but does not expressly make the bank responsible for an 
inaccurate report. In contrast, section 1821(d) does not include language 
concerning accuracy. Thus, First National is distinguishable. 
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Because there is no indication of a congressional intent 
to grant shareholders a private right to enforce the FDIC's 
duty to provide an accounting, we will affirm the dismissal 
of this claim. We emphasize, however, that we render no 
opinion on whether the FDIC has a duty to provide an 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's dismissal of appellants' claims. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I concur for the most part with the majority's thorough 
and thoughtful opinion. I cannot, however, agree with their 
conclusion in Part III.C.2. that the appellants do not have 
a right to demand an annual accounting beyond what the 
FDIC might choose to provide to them. The statute states 
that the FDIC shall "consistent with the accounting and 
reporting practices and procedures established by the 
[FDIC], maintain a full accounting of each. . . receivership" 
and that it shall provide to any shareholder or to any other 
member of the public a copy of its annual report with 
respect to each such receivership. 12 U.S.C. 
S 1821(d)(15)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). 
 
I conclude from the above statutory language that the 
shareholders, as well as the general public, have the right 
to an annual report which has been prepared in a manner 
which is consistent with the accounting and reporting 
practices established by the FDIC. It has not been 
documented on the record here that the annual reports 
supplied to appellants by the FDIC do conform to such 
practices. I would therefore remand this issue to the district 
court for a determination whether the reports in question 
meet the required statutory standard. Cf. First Nat'l Bank of 
Gordon v. Department of Treasury, 911 F.2d 57, 62-63 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that bank violated 12 U.S.C.S 161(a), 
requiring an accurate report, when it submitted an 
inaccurate one to the Comptroller of the Currency). 
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